... to 404 and already have been thinking about boasting how they led the offensive which would defeat those backward Russkies. Well, the problem, of course, was that they still thought that US Army Manuals apply for 404 as well as they did in Gulf War. Boy, did they miscalculate. Some interesting points from Marat on Chasov Yar, which only confirm the point I make that no US general can command anything larger than regiment in SMO. They simply have neither knowledge nor experience.
Translation: By the fall of last year, Khortitsa, which at the end of the 2022 was considered the largest military formation among the 4 main formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (240-260 thousand people), lost 150 thousand in just one year. As a result, all the main units, I emphasize, the best that remain at Khortytsya now, concentrated for the defense of Chasov Yar - one at a time, and the majority have already been completely reorganized twice. That is, they were completely destroyed once or twice. But let's take a closer look at them, as this in itself is very interesting. In first place is the supporting and most combat-ready 93rd brigade “Kholodny Yar”. Almost a division in numbers. In two years it was destroyed twice. It is interesting that the “Kholodnye” were considered the most combat-ready, because they fought mainly with the best captured Russian equipment. These are primarily T-72, T-80 and even a few T-90 tanks. And also the best thing the Ukrops had - the T-64 Bulat. The “Kholodnye” were the favorites of the Americans, and, for example, during the autumn-summer campaign of 22, some units were directly led by American officers. True, when the Artyomovskaya meat grinder began, they quickly fled. In second place is the 46th airmobile (airborne) brigade, trained by the British in England, which, by the way, is the most unshabby - it was only reformed once. Next is the 92nd Air Assault Brigade (twice destroyed). These are generally suicide troops. Like the 110th brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Avdeevka. They distinguished themselves by carrying out a massacre of our prisoners together with the Kraken battalion in the village of Novoselovskoye near Svatovo in the fall of the 22nd. Then 16 fighters of the Lugansk militia (now the same 4th brigade) died as martyrs. They put bags over their heads and suffocated them. Oh, what will happen when the Luhansk people reach 92nd.
Oh, we know what's gonna happen and it better be done without any phones around. Sadism towards POWs was "trained" by NATO instructors and this is the only thing they are good at. Recall how US media have been ejaculating in mid 2010s from describing H.R. McMaster who became, for a short while, the National Security Adviser to Trump. What many forgot that at some point there was a description of how McMaster's regiment treated Iraqi Army POWs--inhumanely. Remarkably, the piece was in one of the major US outlets--either New Yorker or NYT, one of those. Now I cannot find it. I tried, maybe you can. But this is the type of the "training", which is based on killing a third rate force which cannot shoot back and is demolished by the way of total air superiority. But McMaster's "story" and PR around his exploits in Iraq are totally inapplicable to the realities of modern war with "peer" or "better than peer", and that is what those American unit commanders learned really fast. Hence, they fled--very little glory in being evaporated by Tornado's salvo or being blown to smithereens by 152-mm shell or 3M14 Kalibr.
Remember a pathetic piece by WSJ in 2017 titled...
The New Cold War Pits a U.S. General Against His Longtime Russian Nemesis. It’s Trump’s national security adviser H.R. McMaster vs. Putin ally Valery Gerasimov
So, yes, they compared (Nemesis, LOL) Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces to a guy who commanded a... regiment in Iraq. I reacted already then:
Apart from obvious gross mismatch in rank, command, responsibilities and accomplishments--Gerasimov's level is a level of the Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff--one is forced to ask the question: and what are those "military thinking" accomplishments of McMaster per him being a Director, Concept Development and Experimentation? Almost ten years passed from the moment of McMaster's involvement with US doctrine. And what are the results?
